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'It was the best of times and it was the worst of times' is
an apt description of the state of United States policy on
ballistic missile defenses in the 1980s. President Reagan's
'Star Wars' speech of 23 March 1983 was the focus of much of the
strategic debate for this decade both in the United States and
around the world. The speech certainly renewed interest in the
topic of strategic defenses but it is also clear that the United
States may now be as far away as ever from actually deploying
effective strategic defenses. In his speech, Reagan offered a
sweeping long-term vision of a world transformed from reliance on
offensive retaliatory punishment for deterrence to a world where
Americans and our allies "could live secure in the knowledge that
their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S.
retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and
destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own
soil or that of our allies." 1 In order to bring this vision to
fruition, Reagan called upon the American scientific community to
create the technology to make nuclear weapons "impotent and
obsolete. "^ Reagan's announcement of his sweeping strategic
vision was the seminal strategic event of the decade not only
because it reopened the debate on the utility of strategic
defenses among the national security community but also, and
perhaps more importantly, his vision sparked the imagination of
the American public and literally changed the shape of the
domestic political playing field for strategic issues almost
overnight. With his long-term vision, Reagan at least
temporarily largely defused both those in the national security
community who were critical of his nuclear strategy and strategic
modernization programs and also those elements of the public who
saw him as a nuclear warmonger and who called for a nuclear
freeze as the best first step to ending the nuclear arms 'race'.
The Strategic Defense Initiative ( SDI ) was the research
program created to investigate the prospects of strategic
defenses in accordance with President Reagan's vision and the
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) was the agency
created within the Department of Defense (DoD) to manage the
program. As with many other programs during Reagan's tenure, his
SDI was ambiguous enough to appear to be many things to many
people and thereby provide great initial political utility while
leaving many of the difficult and inevitable political and
financial bills to be paid in the future. In responding to the
president's vision, SDI was at first primarily concerned with
developing exotic and highly competent systems which could be
capable of rendering ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete.
More recently, the program has focused more heavily on less
capable but more mature systems perhaps in an attempt to
capitalize on the fleeting remaining years of Reagan's second
term by presenting early deployment options. In the event,
Reagan did not push for early deployment of strategic defense
systems and remained true to the spirit of his 1983 speech which
noted that investigation of the feasibility of strategic defenses
would reguire a long term research program and that any decisions
on deployment would have to be made by future presidents and
future congresses. The SDI program has also failed to provide
any authoritative guidance for our strategic roadmap for moving
from our current situation to a defense dominated world.
Moreover, SDI has evolved against a complex and changing
international milieu where perceptions of its
t
utility vis a vis
the Soviet threat or as a bargaining chip in arms negotiations
have waxed and waned. Thus, it is hardly surprising that both
the ultimate purpose and the shorter term goals of the SDI
program are less than clear to both supporters and critics of the
program. It is also egually clear that Reagan's 1983 vision was
essential to creating the program but cannot now guide the
current direction of the program. Moreover, the inevitable
political and financial costs of the program are becoming
increasingly apparent and will be more and more difficult to
sustain based solely on Reagan's long-term strategic vision of
1983.
The bills on SDI are now coming due. Unless the program can
be restructured to provide visible positive feedback on shorter
term goals, then it is probably doomed to irrelevancy in terms of
providing near-term defense deployments and will probably revert
to the lower funding levels and the lesser attention which
strategic defense research efforts received before our disparate
strategic defense related programs were coalesced into the SDI
rubric. This report will argue that if SDI does not lead to
near-term deployment it would be a great tragedy not only because
deployed strategic defenses offer the U.S. opportunities for
strengthened deterrence, improved stability, improved negotiating
leverage, and improved superpower relations but also because the
demise of SDI would represent a dangerous failure of political
will and is probably avoidable if SDI can be packaged and sold to
the American public properly. The American public is at best
only marginally interested in strategic issues, has a notoriously
short attention-span, and is far more receptive to strategic
developments perceived to be positive: SDI must be packaged and
sold in light of these political realities. Because the forces
opposing SDI leading to near-term deployments are powerful, the
orientation and the packaging of the program must be changed soon
or it is likely that we will see a repeat of the 1960s strategic
defense debate wherein the political impetus for deployments will
erode as the technical capabilities of the system increase. This
report will examine the political prospects for turning SDI from
a research program into a deployment program in the near-term
through an analysis of SDI in three areas: 1) a review of the
strategic benefits of deploying a near-term, limited defense
system, 2) an overview of the political and financial forces
arrayed against near-term deployment, and 3) some specific
potential strategies which might advance the near-term deployment
option.
Before turning to our analysis of the political prospects
for the SDI program leading to near-term strategic defense
deployments we must first examine some fundamental questions
related to the whole concept of Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMD).
In evaluating BMD in general most lines of inquiry revolve around
three interrelated broad question areas: 1) will it work?, 2) how
much will it cost?, and 3) will it make nuclear war more or less
likely? This report will focus on question number three by
arguing that questions number one and two can only be answered
within a strategic/political context and only question number
three fully opens this strategic/political context. In other
words, the desirability of strategic defenses is primarily a
strategic/political question rather than a technical or fiscal
problem. How one approaches the strategic/political question
will largely determine how one answers the other questions
regarding strategic defenses.
Question number one revolves around technology and can
involve arcane discussions of problems involved with the cutting
edge of science in many areas such as physics, mechanics,
engineering, and computer software and technology. These
discussions in turn generally devolve into debates between rival
factions of 'experts'. This approach generates a great deal more
heat than light; because the technical merits of these debates
almost always exceed the technical understanding of the audience,
the public is left to accept or reject the arguments of the big
name experts on the opposing sides as articles of faith.
Moreover, since most of these big name experts have already made
up their minds concerning the feasibility or desirability of
strategic defenses (most were heavily involved in the BMD debate
of the 60s) their arguments do not necessarily relate to the
technical merits of the issue at hand but rather reflect their
predetermined strategic preferences couched in technical
language. Ultimately, the entire question of the technical
feasibility of strategic defenses relates more to judgements
about the strategic utility of certain hypothesized warhead
leakage rates than to the technical problems involved with
strategic defense per se. Almost no one wixl argue that
strategic defenses can be built that have extremely low or zero
leakage rates and likewise almost no one will argue that we do
not now have the technology to destroy or disable some percentage
of attacking boosters and warheads plus decoys. Thus, the
question of whether a strategic defense system will work or not
becomes at what maximum level of leakage do strategic defenses
become strategically significant and how much technological
innovation and financial commitment is required to reach this
point. This is a strategic/political question and while
technology can offer direction and guidance, technology by itself
cannot answer the question.
Likewise, financial questions about the costs of deploying
strategic defense systems must take place within the context of
the strategic utility and political trade-offs required to field
the system in question or this debate will end up being similarly
sterile. The public has been subjected to an extremely wide range
of cost estimates for the deployment of strategic defenses.
Estimates ranging from as much as a Trillion dollars or more down
to as little as ten to twenty-five Billion dollars for completely
deployed systems have been widely circulated.-* These estimates
reflect different deployment options, modes and architectures in
reaching their vastly differing estimates for the cost of a fully
deployed system. More importantly, however, these divergent
estimates are driven by fundamental disagreements on the
strategic/political question of how much leakage the system can
allow in order to have strategic utility. Those who believe
strategic defenses have little strategic/political utility unless
they have extremely low or zero leakage rates present cost
estimates for extremely robust, redundant, and complex systems
requiring birth to death tracking of many thousands of objects
and capable of reaching such levels of near perfection. Those
who believe that strategic defenses have strategic/political
utility at far lower levels of effectiveness present cost
estimates which reflect less complete and complex systems. Thus,
examining raw cost comparisons in a strategic/political vacuum is
nearly useless. Of course, any decision to deploy strategic
defenses will also be subjected to the normal intensely political
process by which all military systems are funded by our
government. In this context, judgements about appropriate
funding levels for strategic defense deployment must be made in
the context of trade-offs between other defense procurements and
will be a primarily political decision.
Having examined why focus on questions one or two in
isolation cannot really help us to decide whether the U.S. should
proceed with deployment of strategic defenses, we must now turn
to the central issue: an examination of the interrelationship
between strategic defenses and U.S. nuclear strategy. As
deterrence of nuclear war is the primary goal of U.S. nuclear
strategy, it seems appropriate to ask question number three in
the form given above but the interrelationship between strategic
defenses and strategy is clearly more subtle and all-encompassing
than can be captured by the relatively simple question of whether
strategic defenses increase or decrease the likelihood of nuclear
war. The difficulty in posing a simple question which adequately
describes the interrelationship between our nuclear strategy and
strategic defenses illustrates the complexities involved in any
discussion of strategy. Indeed, perhaps one of the reasons why
questions number one and two above seem to receive more attention
and discussion is that these questions can be rather well bounded
and are suitable for empirical testing whereas any discussion of
strategy does not lend itself to empirical testing, is less well
bounded and generally more esoteric in nature. Nonetheless, we
must focus on the interrelationship between our nuclear strategy
and strategic defenses because this is an essential intellectual
underpinning for any analysis of technology or costs as discussed
above.
Another intellectual barrier to analysis of the
interrelationship between strategic defenses and U.S. nuclear
strategy is the lack of precision surrounding the concept of
deterrence. There is a wide and probably irreconcilable schism
between those who believe that the fundamental reality of the
nuclear age dictates that deterrence is best maintained through
the threat of societal punishment and those who believe that the
evolving dynamics of both offensive and defensive weapons
technology dictate that deterrence is best maintained by the
ability to deny the war objectives of the enemy. This
fundamental schism largely determines how those in each school of
thought view the utility of strategic defenses. Those in the
deterrence by punishment or Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)
school would logically see great utility only in strategic
defenses which offered a very high level of societal protection
and even then this would not be their preferred policy choice
because the logic of MAD dictates that it would be better to
leave both sides virtually defenseless and thereby reduce the
need for large numbers of offensive forces. Those in the
deterrence by denial school would logically see utility in
strategic defenses of lesser capability so long as these defenses
could help to deny enemy war objectives. A related problem
concerning deterrence and strategic defenses is captured by the
popular admonition that 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it'. In
relation to strategic defenses, this would imply that since
offensive only nuclear deterrence has worked for 44 years so far
it would be foolish to disrupt the stable basis on which that
deterrence rests with the introduction of something as radical as
strategic defenses. While superficially appealing, this line of
reasoning has several flaws: First, one can never determine why
deterrence is operative, only detect when it has failed. Second,
this line of reasoning would seem to view the strategic balance
as static rather than dynamic and would deny the impact of
technological change on strategy and credibility when technology
has obviously played a crucial role in shaping our strategy in
the past and history is replete with examples of offensive-defen-
sive interaction. Finally, closing the door on strategic defense
options keeps the ultimate basis for deterrence resting on the
threat of massive societal punishment based on a political judge-
ment -- a basis which would seem to be unacceptable over the
long-term, especially if other options might be available.
Strategic Benefits of Near-Term Limited Strategic Defenses
A complete analysis of all of the strategic benefits of a
near-term deployment of strategic defenses is beyond the scope of
this paper. However, the most important rationales must be
presented here since they form the underpinning for the political
strategies detailed below. Perhaps the most obvious rationale
for the United States to move toward near-term strategic defense
deployments is that such defenses are a necessary and logical
adjunct to our current nuclear strategy. Despite the fact that
the MAD concept dominates much of the public (and also to a
lesser degree official) thinking on the subject of nuclear
deterrence and also provides the basis for the 1972 SALT I
Interim Agreement and ABM Treaty, MAD has not provided the
intellectual basis for U.S. nuclear strategy as it has evolved
since SALT I. While still seemingly useful as a declaratory
policy or as a tool to measure 'how much is enough?', MAD had
never been useful as a guide to force employment and the
credibility problems with MAD as a basis for our nuclear strategy
began to surface immediately following SALT 1.^ The 1974
Schelsinger Doctrine represents the earliest official repudiation
of MAD since it emphasized the development of Limited Nuclear
Options (LNOs) to enhance deterrence across the spectrum and
provide our National Command Authority (NCA) with preplanned
options for nuclear use below the level of societal punishment
implied by MAD. During the remainder of the 1970s, U.S. nuclear
strategy continued to move further away from MAD as Multiple
Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology and
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accuracy continued to improve and MAD was seen as a less and less
credible basis for nuclear deterrence.
The movement of U.S. nuclear strategy away from MAD reached
technical and force structure limitations with the promulgation
of Presidential Directive (PD) 59 by President Carter in 1980.
This secret product of Carter's National Security Council
apparatus reportedly moved the U.S. nuclear targeting policy to a
heavy emphasis on countermilitary and countercontrol targets and
as such was a complete reversal of the targeting priorities
implied by a MAD philosophy. Indeed, the demanding scope of the
target base outlined by PD 59 was apparently beyond the reach of
U.S. weapons and intelligence capabilities and President Reagan
therefore reportedly adopted a similar but less stringent set of
targeting priorities in his National Security Decision Directive
(NSDD)-13 of 1981. Given the actual development of U.S. nuclear
doctrine, it is somewhat ironic that President Carter was
popularly perceived as a wimp and President Reagan was seen as a
trigger-happy cowboy. It is abundantly clear that by the early
1980s MAD no longer served to guide U.S. nuclear strategy --
instead our strategy had reverted to a more traditional
war-fighting and denial approach to deterrence.
The evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy away from MAD is
significant in that it highlights the need for strategic
defenses. Deterrence based on the ability to credibly conduct
militarily significant nuclear war operations and deny the enemy
his wartime objectives cannot be complete without some form of
defense. Even limited and low levels of strategic defenses can
be significant in disrupting the timing and military objectives
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of an enemy strike and, of course, these military benefits become
more significant as the defenses become more robust and acquire
the capability to defend high value targets preferentially. Just
as the logic behind MAD dictates very low levels or no strategic
defenses, the logic of deterrence by denial dictates that
strategic defenses are a necessary adjunct to the ability to
credibly conduct militarily significant nuclear war operations.
While the evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy has not been without
debate, it is significant that both Democratic and Republican
administrations have strongly adopted the shift to deterrence by
denial and the burden of proof should rest upon those who do not
agree with this shift in emphasis to explain why administrations
as disparate as those of Carter and Reagan would have both
strongly endorsed this reorientation in U.S. nuclear strategy.
Given the context of the evolution of U.S. nuclear doctrine, it
is clear that Reagan's 1983 'star wars' speech was more of an
evolutionary adjunct to our evolving strategy than the 'bolt from
the blue' which it is often characterized to be.
An interrelated concept which also points to the logical
need for strategic defenses relates to the continuing
improvements in Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
(C3I) capabilities and in ballistic missile accuracies by both
superpowers. Indeed, the entire evolution of U.S. nuclear
strategy in the postwar period can be thought of as a continuous
intricate dance between strategy and technology with the constant
objective of credibility. Credible strategies must reflect the
military capabilities of our evolving technology. Just as the
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inaccurate single warhead ballistic missiles of the 1960s
dovetailed well into the concept of MAD, the advent of MIRVs and
the evolutionary improvements in ballistic missile accuracy and
C3I made any strategy based on MAD both less credible and also
facilitated the movement towards a nuclear strategy based on
deterrence by denial. These trends towards greater accuracies
and better C3I continue today and this evolution highlights the
need for strategic defenses. As terminal guidance and/or
navigational updates via the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS)
or the Soviet GLONASS system will greatly enhance the accuracy of
ballistic missile warheads, both superpowers also continue to
make significant improvements to their C3I networks. Thus, we
are rapidly approaching the time when both superpowers will be
able to conduct intercontinental strikes with near zero Circular
Error Probable (CEP) and realtime C3I networks to facilitate
'shoot-look-shoot' targeting strategies. Indeed, with these type
of accuracies and C3I networks, the superpowers may also soon
move towards non-nuclear strategic weapons and these type of
weapons could strain deterrence in the absence of any defenses
since there would seemingly be fewer disincentives for their use
when compared with nuclear weapons.
The cumulative impact of these evolutionary technological
improvements means that any fixed and locatable target which is
not superhardened is today very vulnerable and will only become
more vulnerable as the technology improves. These technological
improvements have an obvious negative impact on both crisis and
strategic stability. When the probability of kill for any fixed
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^arget which is not superhardened becomes essentially the
reliability of the missile, both superpowers have increased
incentives to strike first or to overreact in crisis situations.
Introduction of even very limited and incomplete strategic
defenses change these calculations significantly because of their
capability to disrupt at least the timing of a comprehensive
first strike. Moreover, only strategic defenses offer the
potential to make stabilizing contributions across the board in
this area -- introduction of the mobile small ICBM or
superhardening of crucial C3I links would both be important and
would both make stabilizing contributions but could not provide
the synergistic effect which strategic defenses give to all
systems. Of course, the stabilizing contributions of strategic
defenses in this area become more pronounced as the defenses
become more robust and preferential boost-phase intercepts are
added to the defensive architecture.
Many critics of SDI attack the program on the basis of their
perceptions of SDI ' s impact on US-USSR arms control negotiations.
The basic thrust of these type of arguments is generally that the
U.S. cannot have its cake and eat it too -- we must either choose
SDI or strategic arms control. These arguments are certainly
buttressed by the virulent attacks on SDI often made by the
Soviets and their traditional continuing theme that SDI is the
primary stumbling block to a comprehensive START agreement which
encompasses a 50% reduction in certain categories of offensive
weapons. In this context, the recent Soviet offer to formally
end their insistence on explicit linkage between SDI and START
made by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to Secretary of State Baker
14
at Jackson Hole, Wyoming largely defuses this line of
argumentation . ° Moreover, this Soviet retreat from their
initial negotiating position is reminiscent of their negotiating
strategy in relation to the INF talks where they eventually
backed away from several strategic defense related preconditions
(as well as agreeing to resume the talks following their walkout)
in order to reach the INF Treaty. Now that the Soviet
precondition of an explicit linkage between SDI and START has
been removed, we can examine the interrelationship between START
and SDI on the basis of our overall nuclear strategy and not
primarily on the basis of a more narrow arms control focus.
Highlighting certain features of current US-USSR strategic arms
control efforts can show both that our current START efforts will
not necessarily lead to a more stable strategic environment and
also that strategic defenses and arms control are not necessarily
inherently mutually exclusive (as they are too often portrayed to
be) and that in many situations strategic defenses can actually
enhance efforts towards significant arms control.
Contrary to popular perceptions, past US-USSR strategic arms
control has not necessarily lead to greater strategic stability,
actual reductions in numbers of weapons, or even improved US-USSR
political relations. Today, given the attitude of the current
leadership of the USSR and the generally good relations which
presently prevail between the US and the USSR it is reasonable to
hope that the ongoing START negotiations can produce some true
progress towards arms reductions and improved US-USSR relations.
Yet, the ironic twist to these negotiations lies in the
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relationship between strategic stability and arms reductions:
with the present and foreseeable force structure of the U.S.,
arms reductions of the type envisioned by START actually serve to
decrease strategic stability. The reasons for this inverse
relationship between numbers of strategic weapons and strategic
stability lies both in the structure of earlier US-USSR arms
control regimes and in the evolving nature of strategic
technology detailed above.
To a certain degree, our current and foreseeable strategic
force structure is a vestige of US-USSR arms control of the SALT
era because it reflects our past emphasis on MAD in nuclear
strategy and also the counting rules of the SALT era. Clearly,
the current U.S. strategic force structure with its heavy
emphasis on Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles ( SLBMs ) was not
designed to optimize our nuclear warfighting capability. A major
goal of the U.S. in the SALT I negotiations was to 'move the
Soviets out to sea' by attempting to increase the utility of
SLBMs within the context of the Interim Agreement and under the
overarching MAD construct. 7 SLBMs are ideal MAD weapons --
they are assumed to be invulnerable to preemption and also too
inaccurate to be used for counterforce targeting. While
difficult to guantify, MAD thinking certainly contributed to and
continues to influence the U.S. emphasis on SLBMs. The advent of
the D-5 SLBM will supposedly correct the lack of counterforce
potential of current U.S. SLBMs. MAD and SALT notwithstanding,
the Soviets have generally maintained their heavy emphasis on
ICBMs (60% of their current strategic warheads are on ICBMs) and
START does nothing to reduce this potentially threatening
16
asymmetry in prompt hard target kill capability and throwweight.
Thus, the U.S. enters the START regime with a force structure
which largely reflects our MAD orientation and without
negotiating leverage or incentives for the Soviets to reduce
their heavy reliance on counterforce capable ICBMs.
A more serious problem with the current and foreseeable U.S.
force structure relates to the mismatch between SALT and START
counting rules and the degree to which our current force
structure was designed with an eye to SALT era counting rules.
In this context, the problem is that we have designed a force
structure with a limited number of launch platforms and heavily
MIRVed missiles since under SALT the counting rules limited
launchers. Now, under START, the counting rules more properly
deal with warheads but our force structure matches far better
with the old counting rules than with the new counting rules.
Quite simply, given our current and projected strategic force
structure, the U.S. will have too many eggs in too few baskets
and this problem will only be exacerbated with the START proposed
50% cut in warheads. Thus, under START, the U.S. will find
herself in a position where a combination of a reduced number of
aimpoints and the technological advances in technology discussed
above could combine to make the strategic balance more precarious
since each side will possess more capable warheads and the
leverage gained by initiating a strike will increase. To some
degree, the Soviets have already mitigated this problem by making
their SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs mobile. It remains to be seen how
far the U.S. will be able to advance the mobility option for our
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ICBMs especially in light of the internecine warfare required to
field any of our MX ICBMs.
Another major arms control related point made by those who
oppose deploying strategic defenses deals with the
action-reaction model concerning the interrelationship between
strategic defenses and offensive force levels. Much of the logic
underpinning the stability assumed to be inherent in MAD and SALT
I derived from the posited interrelationship between these two
factors. Simply put, this interrelationship logically posits
that there is a direct link between defensive capabilities and
required offensive force levels; the more capable the defenses,
the more the offensive forces must be increased to overcome these
defenses. Of course, as actually formulated in the ABM Treaty
and the Interim Agreement, this interrelationship would logically
imply that neither side had any incentive to increase their
offensive force levels since the superpowers had codified a
'plateau of stability' where both sides were assumed to have
sufficient forces to inflict assured destruction on the other
side and defenses were frozen at essentially a zero level.
Unfortunately, the evolution of the nuclear force structures and
doctrines of the superpowers towards greater numbers of more
capable warheads and warfighting doctrines since SALT I
dramatically illustrates the fact that many factors are at work
in shaping the nuclear balance between the superpowers and
stability is a very difficult condition to achieve. Given the
actual development of the strategic balance following SALT I, the
burden of proof should rest upon those who argue that stability
and low levels of offensive forces will flow more or less
18
automatically from low levels of strategic defenses.
Instead of evaluating strategic defenses from a MAD
perspective in which their deleterious effects upon strategic
stability and arms control are accepted as articles of faith
since they flow logically from conditions assumed to be inherent
in a MAD world, we must instead evaluate the potential for
contributions to stability and arms control which strategic
defenses could make based on the actual evolution of the
superpower balance. In this context, strategic defenses could
make significant contributions to comprehensive superpower arms
control regimes in three interrelated ways: First, effective
strategic defenses would reduce the military utility of ballistic
missiles and would thereby increase the incentives to make
substantial cuts in these forces. So long as ballistic missile
warheads are given essentially a free ride to their targets,
neither superpower has a great incentive to radically reduce the
numbers of these warheads since these reductions relate more to
political posturing than to any strategic rationale. Second,
reducing the strategic utility of ballistic missiles would serve
to move the superpowers towards more stable and less threatening
types of weapons systems which would not offer the capability for
prompt hard target kill. Finally, effective strategic defenses
could serve as a type of insurance policy against cheating by
either side. Negotiating extremely low ballistic missile levels
which otherwise might be attractive to both sides could be very
difficult in the absence of effective strategic defenses since
extremely low force levels present more serious problems related
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to potential cheating. For example, the relative effect of 100
clandestine ballistic missiles under a negotiated ceiling of 500
warheads is obviously far greater than under the current and
projected far higher ceilings and, unfortunately, our ability to
monitor and verify with high confidence would seem to be bounded
by technology and inspection regimes but would be independent of
and inversely related to the negotiated force levels.
A final point where the interrelationship between strategic
defenses and arms control could be critical involves the process
of transition from total reliance on offensive only retaliation
for deterrence to a more balanced offense-defense balance and
finally towards defense dominance. Without U.S. -Soviet
negotiations to help manage this transition by making it more
predictable and stable, the process of transition presents great
potential for instability. The greatest potential for
instability would lie in a unilateral deployment of effective
strategic defenses by either superpower and preventing this is,
of course, the primary intent of the ABM Treaty. Thus, a
restructured ABM Treaty regime can and should serve as a
principal focus for the defensive transition of the superpowers;
through renegotiation or modification it could serve as a
measuring and limiting tool as the two sides move to bilaterally
and relatively equally increase their levels of strategic
defenses. Additionally, use of the ABM Treaty regime to manage
the defense transition could help to avoid the problem of
unilateral deployment of partially effective defenses (good
enough to effectively thwart a ragged retaliation but not good
enough to effectively deal with a first strike) by both managing
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the bilateral defensive deployments and the numbers and
capabilities of the offensive forces. Overall, the recent Soviet
decision to no longer hold START hostage to restrictions on SDI
portents that the U.S. and Soviet Union may be able to achieve a
truly cooperative transition to strategic defenses and that arms
control can play an essential role in helping to make this
transition more stable and predictable.
Other features of the international environment indicate
that the U.S. should think very seriously about moving to deploy
limited strategic defenses in the near term even if we are not
able to establish a cooperative transition regime with the
Soviets. The changes begun by Gorbachev have created enormous
instabilities throughout the Communist world. While most of
these changes appear to be heading in a direction which would
ultimately benefit both the U.S. and those countries now
Communist, Gorbachev has also unleashed tremendous pent up forces
which will be very difficult to control. No one should feel
sanguine about predicting where the U.S.S.R. will find herself in
the next five years. One only need look to the events in
Tienanmen Square to recognize that the changes initiated by
Gorbachev need not have a happy outcome for either the Soviets or
the U.S. Instability and rapid change can undermine the
rationality required for deterrence to operate. To present a
possible worst case scenario: consider the possibility that the
Soviet Union could devolve into a number of warring republics
many of which would possess significant nuclear capability. How
much nuclear restraint and forbearance would the warlords ruling
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these republics demonstrate if their survival wer*7 threatened
and where would they target their nuclear warheads?
The instabilities in the current international system also
serve to illustrate the fragile basis of worldwide deterrence.
The same technological improvements which have increased the
effectiveness of the arsenals of the superpowers have also
introduced new and less costly yet more potent technologies to
many other countries around the world. Many countries now posses
or will soon acguire the capability to build ballistic missiles
and the spread of this technology is proving extremely difficult
to counter. The 'war of the cities' during the Iran-Iraq War is
a gristly illustration of the potential uses of this new
technology recently acquired by the developing world. As more and
more countries acquire these capabilities, worldwide deterrence
becomes increasingly complex and the probability of the use of
some of these weapons increases (due to increased chances for
accidents if nothing else). Maintaining bilateral deterrence
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is difficult enough but
that task looks easy compared to attempting to deter an extremely
wide variety of threats from extremely divergent groups. In this
environment, the development of a limited near-term strategic
defense system by the U.S. could prove extremely beneficial. We
may soon no longer enjoy the luxury of maintaining deterrence
based on what we consider rationality and would be far better
served by defenses than by retaliation. Of course, many will
argue that building strategic defenses against this type of
emerging threat is itself irrational since the chances of this
threat being realized via ballistic missiles is remote and many
22
threat being realized via ballistic missiles is remote and many
other delivery methods or threats would be cheaper and more
credible. Nonetheless, if the U.S. does move to deploy limited
strategic defenses in the near-term it could serve to devalue the
potential benefits of ballistic missile development by emerging
countries. More importantly, U.S. development of strategic
defenses could help bolster American resolve in an increasingly
dangerous world -- a world where American have recently shown a
great tendency to panic in reaction to even minor potential
threats. How would a country which strongly overreacts to the
discovery of a couple of poisoned Tylenol capsules, apples, or
grapes respond to a Quadaffi brandishing a few ballistic missiles
with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads? Clearly,
strategic defenses can have great potential benefits for the U.S.
both within and outside the context of bilateral U.S. -Soviet
Relations
.
Political and Economic Forces Arrayed Against SDI
Despite the potential for very significant contributions
from a near-term limited strategic defense system as discussed
above, our current SDI efforts appear to be running out of steam.
A wide range of individuals, organizations, and factors are
converging on SDI and cumulatively they spell real trouble for
the continuation of a large scale research program let alone any
type of near-term deployment. Identifying and gaining a
rudimentary understanding of these factors converging on SDI is
essential to exploring viable strategies for selling SDI as will
be discussed below.
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From the domestic politics perspective, perhaps the most
readily identifiable factor working against SDI is the change in
administrations from Reagan to Bush. SDI was very clearly Ronald
Reagan's baby (it was often characterized as the President's SDI)
and he was quite willing to be the heavy on more than one
occasion in order to keep the program energized and avoid the
perception that it was a bargaining chip.** Reagan's strong
support for SDI research helped to initially keep the program
independent from the budgetary battles within the Pentagon and to
encourage support from Congress. President Bush's level of
commitment to the program is far less clear and moreover he is
generally less decisive in his leadership style. While Bush and
especially Vice President Dan Quayle have made several policy
statements generally supportive of SDI, strategic defenses do not
appear to be a top priority of this administration. ^ Perhaps
the best way to illustrate the differences between the Reagan and
the Bush approaches is to recognize that Reagan was ideologically
committed to SDI while Bush is more pragmatic in general and
seems to support strategic defenses on this basis. Bush's
pragmatic support for SDI may be quite strong but it is still not
the same as Reagan's ideological commitment and will probably
prove to be insufficient to provide focus and discipline for the
executive branch bureaucracy involved with SDI or to be very
persuasive to members of Congress. Strong, consistent, and
visible presidential support is critical to the viability of
almost any large scale undertaking of our government; the SDI
will flounder without this type of presidential support, and,
currently, President Bush is not providing the actual or
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perceived type of leadership in relation to SDI which could
advance strategic defense deployment options.
Another critical change in personnel also took place in
January 1989. Lieutenant General James Abrahamson stepped down
as head of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO)
and was replaced by Lieutenant General George Monahan. Both
Generals are from the Air Force and represent the determined
effort of the Air Force to maintain military control of and
provide direction for the SDI. However, despite being from the
same service, Abrahamson and Monahan bring very different
perspectives and styles to bear on the issue of strategic
defenses. Abrahamson was very energetic, positive and
sales-oriented in his approach to SDI in his appearances before
Congress and the public. Monahan is far more low-key and focused
on management rather than sales. Moreover, Abrahamson and
Monahan also serve to illustrate important perceptions towards
SDI held within powerful quarters of the military: despite the
fact that he came to SDIO from a string of successful assignments
and was perceived to be on the rise within the Air Force,
Abrahamson left SDIO after his five year stint without his fourth
star; conversely, Monahan was sent to SDIO with just a little
more than one year to go before he reaches mandatory retirement
after 3 5 years of service. The bottom line message is quite
clear -- the top military leadership did not agree with
Abrahamson in his strong support for SDI and now see SDIO as a
final posting before a general is sent out to pasture. Both of
these developments bode ill for SDIO and illustrate a fundamental
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lack of support or at best lukewarm support for SDI within the
military.
Those who do not follow the SDI closely generally
assume that it is just another one of those overpriced and unnec-
essary programs foisted upon the unsuspecting American public by
the Pentagon. In the case of SDI this conventional wisdom is
fundamentally wrong. SDI did not originate in the Pentagon and
neither the civilian leadership nor the services are very
comfortable with the idea of strategic defenses in general and
are extremely uncomfortable with the prospects of funding any
significant strategic defense deployment. This is not to say,
however, that the SDI enjoys no support within the Pentagon. SDI
represents a significant infusion of money and all organizations
welcome increased funding, especially for basic research and
development.
In order to understand the Pentagon's position, one must
distinguish between the SDI and actual programs designed to
deploy strategic defenses in the near-term. In this context, the
rationale behind the Pentagon's support for SDI as a source of
funding but general opposition to programs designed to actually
deploy strategic defenses in the near-term (which at first seems
to be contrary to the 'logical' position of the Department of
Defense) become clearer when one examines the roles, missions,
and identities of the services. The lack of institutional
support for deployed strategic defenses from the services flows
directly from the fact that strategic defense is not and has not
been a primary role or mission for any service nor is the idea of
providing strategic defenses a fundamental element of the
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identity of any of the services. Thus, while the SDI might be a
useful source of funding and could produce spin-offs in other
weapon areas, none of the services have any institutional
incentives to take the lead in pushing for deployment of
strategic defenses. Not only are there no institutional
incentives for the services to push for deployment of strategic
defenses but currently, given the DoD's attempts to fund the
remnant of Reagan's strategic modernization program with a
shrinking budget, there are strong incentives for each service to
protect their own core budget at the expense of everything else.
Indeed, within the current budgetary environment, the services
have sought to use SDI as an additional source of funding for
programs they wanted independent of SDI and thus save their own
budgets for programs essential to their core identity. A final
institutional disincentive towards any service actually pushing
for near-term deployment of strategic defenses relates directly
to the carefully brokered positions of the services concerning
their roles and missions and the relationship of these roles and
missions to significant arms control limitations. In sum, the
services would rather keep the organizational peace within the
DoD rather than entering into the type of internecine warfare
necessary to establish strategic defenses as a core role and
mission of one of the services (or of a new service) or to
dismantle service positions built upon on the ABM Treaty regime.
Thus, from a bureaucratic perspective, it is very clear that
there is little support for SDI within the military and certainly
not the type of support which would push strongly for early
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deployment options.
Another major interrelated problem area facing SDI concerns
Congress and the current severe constraints on the federal
budget. The lack of any real institutional support for SDI within
the DoD (except as a source of funding for basic research or
programs which the services wanted anyway) is exacerbated by the
fact that right now Congress would be unlikely to generously fund
a new large scale program even if the DoD were strongly
supportive. Moreover, the level of support for SDI within the
Congress is eroding for a variety of reasons including: a
perception of weakening public support for strategic defenses,
perceptions of greatly improved U.S.- Soviet relations, new and
unrelated items moving to the top of the policy agenda (e.g.
Eastern Europe, education, and the war on drugs), and a general
lack of national level or constituent oriented direct benefits
from the billions already spent on SDI. The cumulative impact of
these factors will make it very difficult for the Congress to
adequately fund and support SDI as the program is currently
structured. Indeed, the very slight cut in SDI ' s budget for FY
1990 is remarkable under these circumstances.^
Public perceptions of strategic defenses in general and of
the specific progress of SDI form another key element in any
evaluation of the prospects for SDI. In this regard, SDI seems
to enjoy general public support, but this support tends to be
shallow and uninformed and tends to weaken when confronted with
policy or budgetary trade-offs. Additionally, there are two
significant factors which impact on public perceptions of SDI.
The first is a general perception that SDI has not made
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significant technological advances since its inception despite
all the rhetoric and money. This perception relates directly to
the impatience of the American public and the general vision
which the 'star wars' image conjures up. Thus, the actual steady
technological progress of SDI has a very difficult time competing
with the futuristic images held by the public. In this regard,
the current emphasis on near term deployment options featuring
kinetic energy weapons (KEW) such as Brilliant Pebbles could be
perceived as a major retreat from the early public images of SDI
featuring directed energy weapons (DEW). The fact that SDI has
thus far failed to provide any type of 'show-stopper' public
demonstrations no doubt contributes to the public impatience with
SDI and the perception that no significant technological advances
have been made. The second major factor weakening public
perceptions of SDI are the generally negative media and elite
judgements on SDI and strategic defenses in general. The bias of
the media elite against SDI is usually subtle but its cumulative
effect is unmistakable. Likewise, to the extent that political
elites in this country are still enamored with the concept of
MAD, deployed strategic defenses will never be a preferred policy
option. While the effect of the media and elite bias against SDI
may not be that significant in each individual instance, the
long-term cumulative effect can be significant -- one eventually
becomes soaked if forced to stand in even very light drizzle for
a long period of time.
The final major factor impacting upon SDI which we will
examine is perhaps the most significant: the perception of vastly
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improved U.S. -Soviet relations. The rise of Mikhail Gorbachev to
power in the Soviet Union and his restructuring policies of
glasnost and perestroika have fundamentally altered the nature of
U.S. -Soviet relations from the perspective of the American
public. Public perception of the Soviets in general and of the
Soviet threat in particular have undergone a radical shift since
1983 when the SDI program was begun. ** Currently, the need for
strategic defenses or SDI in the context of vastly improved
U.S. -Soviet relations appears to be very questionable in the
minds of the American public. In the present political climate
what matters is not the fact of massive and still expanding
Soviet strategic offensive capabilities but the perception that
these capabilities are on the decline and that they are
increasingly insignificant in the context of U.S. -Soviet
relations. SDI must be packaged and sold in light of the
'Gorbymania' which would appear to be a major component of
U.S. -Soviet relations for the foreseeable future or else it will
never help to advance near-term strategic defense deployment
options
.
Political Strategies to Advance SDI
Having discussed the strategic rationale for near-term
deployment of strategic defenses and also the political forces
currently stacked against movement in this direction, we must now
attempt to reconcile these two opposing forces with some specific
strategies to advance near-term deployment options. In
attempting to build these strategies we must keep in mind that we
live in a political and not a strategic world -- a world where
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decisions are made based upon the more tangible realities of
international relations, domestic budgets and political
trade-offs rather than upon the esoteric logic of strategy.
Moreover, without at least a rudimentary level of political
support, even the most technologically sweet, cost-effective, and
strategically sound strategic defense system will not be advanced
as a near-term deployment option. Here, then, are three specific
options to enhance the political viability of SDI as a path to
near-term deployment options:
1. Change and broaden public perceptions of why near-term
deployments from the SDI are required . Unless the public
perceives specific and logical rationales for near-term
deployments, there will be no near-term deployments. Restoring a
high-level of public support for SDI would seem to be the sine
qua non for advancing near-term deployment options. While this
requirement for popular support may be self evident, specific
strategies to build popular support are less clear and self
evident. The links between the rationale behind near-term
deployment and public support are both subtle and broad-ranging.
Development and advancement of specific strategies to enhance
near-term deployment options could have a synergistic effect on
popular support for SDI and should be the first area of
concentration for an overall strategy to advance near-term
deployment options. What are these strategies to enhance
near-term deployment options?
First, the rationale behind any type of near-term deployment
must be broad enough to attract support from many sectors. In
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this context, it imperative to highlight all of the things a
near-term deployment can do rather than focusing on just how it
can thwart the effects of and lessen the threat of a Soviet first
strike. An overly narrow focus on what percentage of Soviet
warheads would penetrate during a massive first strike does not
illustrate the other substantial potential benefits of a
near-term deployment. Moreover, this focus equates our
deployment with a reactive Soviet first strike in response when,
in fact, any such deployment would greatly complicate any
effective first strike, make such an option a far less rational
choice, and reflects a MAD mindset as discussed above. The
other, and perhaps equally important, strategic rationales for
near-term deployments should be advanced at the same time as
SDI ' s ability to thwart a Soviet first strike. Any near-term
deployment, even if very limited, would have some effectiveness
against accidental launches and while the probability of
accidental launches may be small the consequences could be
enormous. Politicians should be held accountable for keeping
their constituents vulnerable to this threat when their actions
are based on political judgements and not on any technological
shortcomings. Likewise, even limited near-term deployments could
have significant potential to deflect any ballistic missile
attack from other countries as well as making the pursuit of this
technology for threatening purposes less attractive to these
other countries. Highlighting the spread of ballistic missile
technology as well as the means and material to create weapons of
mass destruction could increase support for strategic defenses
since the public should be able to distinguish between deterrence
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of rational attacks and protection from irrational threats.
Finally, public support for strategic defenses could also be
built by emphasizing the synergistic benefits which any near-term
deployment could have for mitigating against the vulnerability
problems which threaten all of our strategic forces. The public
has already been sensitized to the vulnerability problems our
strategic forces face by the MX deployment debates; we need to
build upon these sensitivities by pointing to the potential
benefits any near-term deployment could have in this area,
especially if even very limited preferential defenses could be
more cost effective than passive defense options alone.
Overall, the objective of the strategies outlined in the
paragraph above is to move the public perception of SDI
deployment rationales from a focus on the threat to a focus on
the benefits. Redirecting public attention on SDI away from just
the narrow Soviet first strike threat and onto all of the broader
benefits is essential given the political realities of the
'Gorbymania' era. The American public will not spend billions to
build something to defend them from a threat which they do not
perceive to be very threatening. If SDI is sold strictly as a
means of thwarting a Soviet first strike, it will not have enough
political support to proceed to the stage of near-term
deployments during a period when the American public perceives
that U.S. -Soviet relations have improved and believes that the
prospects for further improvements are excellent. Focusing on
how near-term deployments can enhance U.S. interests by providing
protection against accidents and irrational threats would
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highlight the multilateral nature of the deterrence/defense
problems the U.S. will face in the future and also the bilateral
nature of MAD.
Another substantial benefit to widening the public's
perceptions regarding the strategic rationales behind near-term
deployments relates to public perception about MAD and nuclear
war in general. Indeed, without widening the horizons concerning
the rationales behind strategic defenses it is doubtful that the
American public can ever be weaned away from MAD and its
pernicious influence upon any ideas of strategic defenses. One
of the greatest beauties of MAD is that is so politically
expedient -- once a nation accepts the logic of MAD, they are no
longer required to think seriously about how to fight a nuclear
war since such calculations are irrational by definition nor do
they have to continually spend large sums on strategic forces
since they need not procure more than second strike forces
capable of delivering assured destruction upon the enemy. A
politician could scarcely ask for a better political strategy
because under MAD neither he or his constituents have to think
about nuclear war (indeed the very repulsiveness of the subject
is held to contribute to deterrence) nor is he required to spend
more money on defense. Emphasis on the strategic benefits of
near-term deployments in relation to accidents and threats from
other countries will highlight the bilateral nature and
rationality assumptions inherent in MAD and should serve to
weaken this entire construct as the basis for long term
multilateral stability. Moreover, this reexamination of the
logic forming the basis of MAD should provide an opportunity to
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highlight once again that the U.S. has chosen to attempt to
implement stability on the basis of a mutual hostage relationship
as the result of political choices and not on the basis of some
immutable logic.
A final area in which advancing the broader strategic
rationales behind near-term deployments could prove useful is
linked to the relationship between public perceptions of MAD and
of SDI . Far too much of the public debate and perception
regarding SDI surrounds the idea of creating a ' leakproof
'
astrodome over the U.S. This line of reasoning is detrimental to
near-term deployment options for at least two major reasons:
First, such thinking reflects a MAD framework for evaluating
strategic defenses; it is a framework under which strategic
defenses have to be nearly perfect to have any strategic utility.
This line of thinking reflects an ironic and ultimately untenable
link between MAD thinking and population defense, the most
popular element of SDI. Since the logic of MAD and any
significant level of population defense are mutually exclusive,
it is far better for supporters of strategic defense to make this
fact clear at the outset rather than to have the terms of the
debate set within the MAD framework for judging strategic utility
of strategic defenses. A second related reason why this emphasis
on an astrodome type of defense is detrimental to any near-term
deployment is that it makes it very difficult to achieve these
types of defenses in the real world in which the deployments
would actually be made based upon political choices. This
argument is well summarized by the adage that 'the best is the
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enemy of the good.' It is very unlike 1 y that a complete and
robust strategic defense system will spring forth as did Athena
from the head of Zeus. We may eventually be capable and willing
to field a system which would constitute something approaching an
astrodome, but the steps along the way will certainly have lesser
capabilities and it is highly unwise for the proponents of
near-term deployments to allow themselves to be held to the
standard of near perfection which MAD requires and the astrodome
image implies.
2. Create a powerful agency with the bureaucratic impera-
tive to field near-term deployments . This specific strategy is
fairly straightforward and does not relate specifically to the
strategic rationale behind near-term deployments but focuses
rather on the political realities of the bureaucratic nature of
our government. The rationale behind creating a powerful agency
with the primary mission of fielding near-term strategic defenses
is very clear -- fielding strategic defenses would then be sub-
ject to a fundamental law of any bureaucracy. This fundamental
law of bureaucracy states that the primary driving force behind
any bureaucracy is to expand and defend its turf. Thus, if
fielding strategic defenses were the primary mission of a power-
ful agency, it is likely that this option would be advanced even
if there was not a large amount of public support for this.
Clearly, this hypothesized situation would be very nearly the
antithesis of the current bureaucratic situation in which the
near-term deployment option finds itself. As described above,
today there is no powerful agency with the primary mission to
deploy strategic defenses. Certain elements within SDIO do favor
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near-term deployments but SDIO is currently primarily concerned
with continuing as an entity because it is surrounded by far more
powerful bureaucratic actors many of which do not wish it to
prosper. Because of the fundamental law of bureaucracy, our
current bureaucracies which control the turf under which the
concept of strategic defenses lies have almost no incentive to
give away this turf to a new or redefined agency with strategic
defense as its primary mission. Thus, there is almost no
likelihood that strategic defenses will emerge as a primary
mission of any agency from out of our current bureaucratic
structure.
The creation of an agency with strategic defenses as
its primary mission could also be imposed upon the bureaucracy.
In this context, public opinion could play a crucial role in
helping to create pressure on Congress and the Executive Branch
for an agency with the mission and the required clout to actually
advance the near-term deployment option but this outcome seems
very unlikely. The public seldom wishes to create additional
bureaucracies and at any rate remains to be convinced of the need
for near-term deployments. Thus, while this strategy of creating
an agency devoted to near-term deployments has logical appeal, it
does not now seem very viable politically. Perhaps the best that
can be hoped for in this area is for the broader rationales for
strategic defenses discussed above to stimulate more public
support for the creation of a powerful agency with the mission to
deploy strategic defenses. Or perhaps those favoring near-term
deployments in Congress could attach provisions favorable to the
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bureaucratic position of SDI onto legislation which i s more or
less required such as continuing resolutions or omnibus spending
resolutions
.
Other more limited and incremental type of changes could be
made to SDIO and might prove very beneficial to advancing the
near-term deployment option. General Abrahamson recommended that
the SDIO Directorship be made a four star billet in his end of
tour report and this would undoubtedly provide some greater clout
to the organization but probably not enough within the DoD
hierarchy given the general hostility of the DoD towards
deployment of strategic defenses. Another change that might prove
more beneficial along these lines would be to place SDIO under
more direct civilian control by making the SDIO Director an
Undersecretary of Defense. Any changes which could help SDIO
defend itself against the services and to take on deployment of
strategic defenses as its primary mission would clearly advance
the near- term deployment option.
3. Link SDI directly and specifically to improved
U.S. -Soviet relations . This strategy is similar to the first
strategy outlined above except that here the concern is with
broadening and improving the bilateral versus the multilateral
impact of SDI . The very foundations and core assumptions
underlying U.S. -Soviet and all East-West relations seem to be
transforming before our eyes; SDI must be packaged and sold in
light of these fundamental political transformations or it may
come to be seen as an antiquated irrelevancy in relation to our
changing relationships. Moreover, since strategic defenses can
make so many contributions to long-term strategic stability they
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can and should play an important role in helping to improve
superpower relations over the long-term. In this context,
strategic defenses should be viewed as a technological adjunct to
and an insurance policy for the opportunity to make bold
political moves to radically restructure our relationship with
the Soviets. As we move to dismantle the structures of the cold
war, strategic defenses could help us to remove the bulk of the
most deadly vestige of this ideological struggle: the huge
offensive only nuclear arsenals of the superpowers.
Of course, many would argue that if the relationship between
the superpowers is improving so greatly, why even bother with
building strategic defenses? If our political relationship is so
good, why not just drastically reduce the arsenals of the
superpowers through 'traditional' arms control? These arguments
are appealing and it is inherently a risky business to attempt to
predict the future path of superpower relations; however, several
factors mitigate against this purely political path towards
greater improvements in superpower relations and highlight the
role which strategic defenses could play in the evolution of our
relationship with the Soviets. First, our relationship with the
Soviets is in transition but has not yet been transformed. While
the future currently looks very bright, almost no one is
predicting an end to the long term competition between the
Americans and the Soviets. We may wish to transform our rivalry
into some more benign form such as economic competition but a
wide-scale transformation along these lines is certainly not
imminent. Meanwhile, our current efforts towards these type of
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ends via 'traditional' arms control such as the current START and
Defense and Space Negotiations appear to be bogged down, limited
in scope, and plagued with the structural difficulties outlined
above.
Perhaps it would be wise to draw an analogy between the
recently concluded INF negotiations and the prospects for
strategic defenses playing an enabling role in strategic arms
control. Of course, a myriad of factors surround the INF Treaty
and it would be extremely unwise to offer a monocausal
explanation for this high drama played out for the better part of
a decade; nonetheless, it does appear clear (if counterintuitive)
that the emergence of the Treaty was critically dependent upon
the actual deployment of INF forces by NATO. In other words, a
western buildup of INF forces was critical to the eventual
elimination of INF forces. Applying this analogy onto strategic
defenses and strategic arms control would imply that actual
deployment of strategic defenses could lead to drastic reductions
in strategic forces. While this analogy is far from perfect (the
absence of offense-defense interaction in relation to INF forces
is one fundamental difference), it may still prove useful in
illuminating the structure of current U.S. -Soviet competition as
reflected in our most recent arms control treaty. Thus,
specifically linking deployed strategic defenses to offensive
force reductions within an arms control framework would appear to
be one method of attempting to achieve substantial reductions in
strategic offensive forces and is an approach which deserves
careful examination and consideration. Another way to describe
this approach to linking strategic arms reductions and deployment
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of strategic defenses would be to say that it represents the
antithesis of the MAD inspired framework of the SALT I regime.
Clearly, in attempting to advance this arms control strategy
of linking strategic defenses with offensive reductions we must
confront the MAD philosophy once again. Here, it is most useful
to note that the proponents of MAD not only deny the possibility
for movement away from the mutual hostage relationship between
the superpowers which they assume to be the fundamental truth of
the nuclear age but they also make this assumption into a
positive virtue due to the stabilizing benefits which are assumed
to flow from the mutuality of this condition. The empirical
failure of this construct as embodied by SALT I to produce the
theorized benefits should be incentive enough to attempt other
approaches to U.S. -Soviet relations and arms control efforts.
Moreover, our sanctif ication of the supposed virtue of the
ability of both superpowers to largely incinerate the populations
of the other side must rate as one of the most morally repugnant
and illogical thoughts in all of human history. MAD is clearly
morally repugnant as it "rests on a form of warfare universally
condemned since the Dark Ages -- the mass killing of hostages. "-^
Moreover, threatening to target civilians based on the MAD
targeting philosophy makes the American government into de facto
terrorists since we threaten civilian death on an unimaginable
scale. Likewise, blind adherence to MAD is highly illogical
since the impact of this philosophy on nuclear deterrence is
inherently empirically untestable and is based on assumptions
about the fundamental nature of the nuclear age, it fit well only
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with the nuclear technology of the late 1960s, and it seems to
deny the dynamic interaction between technology and strategy.
Perhaps the most pernicious legacy of our continued adherence to
MAD is that this philosophy will continue to have a poisonous
influence on superpower relations due to its fundamental tenet of
making a virtue out of possession of assured destruction
capability. The time is long past to strongly question this
fundamental assumption and ask ourselves whether we would prefer
that the superpowers continue to maintain the ability to largely
annihilate each other in the name of stability into the
indefinite future or whether other approaches to superpower
stability might be more benign and hopeful.
Reliance on the MAD mindset creates a self-fulfilling
prophesy under which the superpowers must make every effort to
continue to maintain their assured destruction capabilities in
the face of political and technological changes and despite the
fact they would find very little utility in an assured
destruction capability outside the MAD construct. Why continue
to treat a mutual assured destruction capability as a virtue when
such a philosophy is clearly morally repugnant, illogical, and
not a superpower goal or requirement outside the MAD construct?
Indeed, it is instructive to note how close the superpowers
reportedly came to moving towards almost complete nuclear
disarmament at the Reykjavik Summit and while the failure of this
summit to reach this goal is generally laid at the step of SDI
,
perhaps our failure to progress along this avenue and the great
apprehension with which our allies greeted these developments is
more indicative of the west's continued and unwarranted adherence
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to MAD as the only basis for long-term superpower stability.
Many other specific benefits to improved superpower
relations could also be realized by a mutual introduction of
strategic defenses. If our devotion to maintaining a robust
assured destruction capability is devalued through our
reexamination of MAD and the utility of our ballistic missiles is
devalued by introduction of strategic defenses then the way is
opened for truly substantial and meaningful reductions in the
nuclear arsenals of the superpowers. As discussed above,
strategic defenses provide a type of insurance policy against the
dangers of cheating at very low levels of forces and defenses
could therefore serve to enable reductions to very low levels.
Negotiated bilateral introduction of strategic defenses as a
means of reaching very low levels of offensive forces would also
serve to reduce the fears regarding and incentives for either
side backsliding towards increased offensive capabilities or a
return to assured destruction offensive force levels. Perhaps
most importantly, negotiated bilateral introduction of strategic
defenses would focus the efforts of the superpowers onto
defensive technology and the type of defensive systems which are
inherently less threatening than are offensive nuclear systems.
The structure of the postwar world is undergoing fundamental
and seemingly irreversible changes -- changes which will
fundamentally alter the nature of U.S. -Soviet relations.
Strategic defenses offer the superpowers tremendous potential for
long-term stability and continuing improvements in our relations.
Because the knives are clearly out in relation to the DoD budget,
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it is now more important than ever to present politically astute
rationales to advance the viability of SDI . It is hoped that
this report will help to stimulate thoughts and discussions along
these lines as we proceed into the rapidly changing strategic
environment of the 1990s.
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